INTRODUCTION
The year 1978 represented the beginning of a period of rapid economic growth for the Mexican economy. Based on rising oil revenues, foreign loans and investments, and relative political stability, investment, consumption, and income rose at impressive rates. By the early 1980s the growth process faltered. Mexico experienced rising inflation, declining productivity, structural imbalances in most labor markets, and catastrophic rural emigration. As a result, in February 1982 there began a major economic crisis that threatened to choke off the process of economic growth for the foreseeable future. To many observers (Riding 1981; Friedman 1982; Dorfman 1982) the injection of massive oil incomes after 1977 only exacerbated many of the long-standing problems faced by Mexico.
On November 10, 1982, the Mexican government announced an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on a program to ease Mexico's large foreign debt. Under the agreement Mexico may receive $3.84 billion worth of credit from the IMF over the next three' years. To qualify, the government must drastically reduce its deficit, raise taxes, and curb imports.
The purpose of this article is to examine the feasibility and consequences on the Mexican economy of various IMF "type" stabilization programs during the de la Madrid presidency (1982-87). 
